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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the concept of 
modularity, an often cited advantage of the ruled� 
based representation methodology. We argue that 
the notion of modularity consists of two distinct 
concepts which we call syntactic modularity and 
semantic modularity. We argue that when 
reasoning under uncertainty, it is reasonable to 
regard the rute�based approach as both syntactically 
and semantically modular. However, we argue that 
in the case of plausible reasoning, rules are 
syntactically modular but are rarely semantically 
modular. To illustrate this point, we examine a 
particular approach for managing uncertainty in 
rule�based systems called the MYCIN certainty 
factor model. We formally define the concept of 
semantic modularity with respect to the certainty 
factor model and discuss logical consequences of 
the definition. We show that the assumption of 
semantic modularity imposes strong restrictions on 
rules in a knowledge base; we argue that such 
restrictions are rarely valid in practical 
applications. Finally, we suggest how the concept 
of semantic modularity can be relaxed in a manner 
that makes it appropriate for plausible reasoning. 
Introduction 
Researchers in the artificial intelligence community have 
concentrated their efforts on deductive problem solving 
methods. In doing so, they have developed numerous 
approaches for representing and manipulating propositions. 
One methodology that has been used frequently to build 
expert systems is the rule�based representation framework. 
In rule-based systems, knowledge is represented as rules of 
the form "IF A THEN B" where A and B are logical 
propositions. 
An often cited advantage of the rule�based approach is that 
rules can be added or deleted from a knowledge base without 
the need to modify other rules [ 4]. This property is called 
modularity. To our knowledge the concept of modularity has 
never been formally defined. Nevertheless, modularity has 
been informally described in some detail. For example, the 
following two paragraphs are taken from a discussion of 
modularity by Davis [4]: 
We can regard the modularity of a program as 
the degree of separation of its functional units 
into isolatable pieces. A program is highly 
modular if any functional unit can be changed 
(added, deleted, or replaced)' with no unanticipated 
change to other functional units. Thus program 
modularity is inversely related to the strength of 
coupling between its functional units. 
The modularity of programs written as pure 
production systems arises from the important facl 
that the next rule to be invoked is determined 
solely by the contenls of the data base, and no rule 
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is ever called directly. Thus the addition (or 
deletion) of a rule does not require the 
modification of any other rule to provide for or 
delete a call to it. We might demonstrate this by 
repeatedly removing rules from a PS [production 
system]: many systems will continue to display 
some sort of "reasonable" behavior. By contrast, 
adding a procedure to an ALGOL�Iilce program 
requires modification of other parts of the code to 
insure that the procedure is invoiced, while 
removing an arbitrary procedure from such a 
program will generally cripple it. 
.In the above quotation and in other discussions of 
modularity, it seems that two different notions of modularity 
are defined without apparent distinction. One notion is that 
rules can be added or deleted from a knowledge base without 
altering the truth or validity of other rules in the system. 
The other notion is that rules can be added or deleted from a 
knowledge base without modifying the syntax of other rules; 
the inference process can continue in spite of such additions 
or deletions. We will call the former notion semantic 
modularity and the latter syntactic modularity. 
By design. rules are syntactically modular. Furthermore, the 
validity of a rule in a deductive system does not depend on 
other rules in the system's knowledge base. For example, if a 
knowledge base contains the rule 
IF: A and B are parallel lines 
lHEN: A and B do not intersect 
then the addition or deletion of other rules will not affect 
the truth value of this rule. Once this fact is asserted, it 
cannot be falsified by additional facts. Of course, a rule 
might be added that contradicts rules already in the 
knowledge base. Aside from this special case, however, 
categorical rules are semantically modular. Indeed, the 
syntactically modular rute�hased representation scheme may 
have emerged from the recognition that rules are modular in 
the semantic sense. 
As investigators have begun to tackle reat�world problems 
such as mineral exploration, medical diagnosis, and financial 
management, methods for reasoning under uncertainty or 
plausible reasoning have received increasing attention. 
Popular AI approaches that have been developed for 
managing uncertainty include extensions of the production 
rule methodology. In these methodologies, a number is 
attached to each rule which represents the degree of 
association, in some sense, between the antecedent and the 
consequent of the rule. 
In such approaches, the notions of syntactic and semantic 
modularity have been carried over from deductive systems. 
That is, the properties of both syntactic and semantic 
modularity have been ascribed to rules in plausible reasoning 
systems. It seems appropriate to attribute the property of 
syntactic modularity to rules in plausible reasoning systems. 
.Just as in deductive systems, non-categorical rules can be 
added and deleted without the need to modify the syntax of 
other rules. However, in this paper, we argue that it is 
inappropriate to carry over the notion of semantic 
modularity from deductive systems and apply it to systems · 
which must manage uncertainty. We shall see that 
fundamental differences between logical and plausible 
reasoning result in the breakdown of the assumption of 
semantic modularity in rule-based systems which reason 
under uncertainty. 
To demonstrate that it is inappropriate to ascribe the 
property of semantic modularity to rules in plausible 
reasoning systems, we will examine a particular rule-based 
method for reasoning under uncertainty, the MYCIN 
certainty factor (CF) model [5]. We will first present a 
formal definition of semantic modularity with respect to the 
CF model. We will then illustrate several implications of 
semantic modularity and argue that these implications cannot 
be justified in most practical applications. Also in this 
paper, we will discuss a methodology for relaxing the 
assumption of semantic modularity to accommodate plausible 
reasoning. 
We should emphasize that we are not the first to notice 
problems with the assumption of modularity in rule-based 
systems which reason under uncertainty. For example, in the 
closing remarks of their book on rule-based expert systems 
[6], Buchanan and Shortliffe state that many of MYCIN's 
rules do not have the property that we have termed semantic 
modularity. However to our knowledge, there have been no 
efforts to formally define the concept of semantic modularity 
nor have there been efforts to contrast the two concepts o{ 
syntactic and semantic modularity in detail. 
Overview of the MYCIN certainty factor model 
In this section, we will describe the aspects of the MYCIN 
CF model that are essential for . understanding the 
consequences of modularity in rule-based systems which 
manage uncertainty. As mentioned above, the model is an 
adjunct to the rule-based representation framework. A 
certainty factor is attached to each rule that represents the 
change in belief in consequent of tf\e rule given the 
antecedent. Certainty factors range between -1 and 1. 
Positive numbers correspond to an increase in belief in. a 
hypothesis while negative quantities correspond to a decrease 
in belief.! It is important to note that certainty factors do 
not correspond to measures of absolute belief. This 
distinction, with respect to certainty factors as well as other 
measures of uncertainty, has not been emphasized in the 
artificial intelligence literature [7]. 
The following notation will be used to represent a rule in 
the CF model: 
CF(H,E) 
E H 
where H is a hypothesis, E is evidence relating to the 
hypothesis. and CF(H,E) is the certainty factor attached to 
the rule. In MYCIN, multiple pieces of evidence may bear 
on the same hypothesis. In addition, a hypothesis may serve 
as evidence for yet another hypothesis. The result is a 
network of rules such as the one shown in Figure l. This 
structure is often called an inference network [8]. The 
certainty factor model includes a prescription for propagating 
uncertait�ty through an inference network. For example, the 
CF model can be used to compute the change in belief in 
hypotheses G and H when A and B are true (see Figure I). 
Details of the propagation scheme are described in [5] and 
[6]. 
Definition of semantic modularity 
In this section, we construct a formal definition of 
semantic modularity in the context of the MYCIN certainty 
factor model. To motivate the definition, consider the 
Figure 1: An inference network 
following classic example from probability ·theory. Suppose 
an individual is given one of the following two urns: 
�® 66 
The first urn .contains 1 white ball and 2 black balls while 
the second urn contains 2 white balls and 1 black ball. He is 
not allowed to look inside the urn, but is allowed to draw 
balls from the urn, one at a time, without replacement. Let 
H1 be the hypothesis that the individual is holding the first 
urn and H2 be the hypothesis that he is holding the second 
urn. 
Suppose a black ball and then a second black ball are 
drawn from the urn. Upon drawing the second black ball, 
the individual's belief in H1 increases to certainty. In 
contrast, suppose the result of the first draw is a white ball. 
In this case, the draw of the second black ball raises his 
belief in H1 somewhat but does not confirm the hypothes�s. 
Therefore, the effect of the second draw on his belief about 
the identity of the urn is strongly dependent on the result of 
the first draw. 
This example illustrates that changes in belief may depend 
on information available at the time evidence becomes 
known. Therefore, a certainty factor which represents the 
change in belief in a hypothesis H given evidence E should 
be written as a function of three arguments, CF(H,E,e), where 
e denotes information that is known at the time of the 
update. The notion of semantic modularity, however, 
requires that the certainty factor for the rule "IF E THEN 
H" not depend on whether other rules which bear on H have 
fired. Therefore, we take as the format definition of 
semantic modularity: 
CF(H,E,e) = CF(H,E,0) (1) 
for all H and E in the network and for any evidence e that 
might be known at the time E updates H.2 Since certainty 
factors in the CF model are functions of only two arguments. 
the model implicitly assumes (1). 
Consequences of modularity 
Although little can be deduced from the modularity 
property alone, the creators of the CF model, in order to 
justify its use, outlined a set of properties or desiderata that 
should be satisfied by a propagation scheme. For example, 
one desideratum requires that the order in which evidence is 
considered should not affect the result of propagation . These 
desiderata provide tools that can be used to deduce the 
consequences of modularity. 
In fact, we note that the desiderata alone lead to a 
significant consequence. It can be shown that any quantity 
which satisfies the desiderata must be n monotonic 
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transformation of the the likelihood ratio 
x(H,E,e) = p(EIHM)Ip(El-HM). where p(EIHM) is the 
probability of evidence E given hypothesis H in the _context 
of information e and p(El-H/\e) is the probability of 
evidence E given hypothesis H is false. That is, 
CF(H,E,e) = F(x(H,E,e)) for some monotonic increasing 
function F. For example, the mapping 
-{
(X(H,E,e)-1)/X(H,E,e) 
CF(H,E,e) 
)I(H,E,e)-1 
X 2: 1 
(2) 
X < 1 
can be shown to be consistent with one of the central 
methods of propagation used in the CF model [9]. 
We will not present a formal proof of the above nor 
proofs of the consequences of semantic modularity in this 
paper. Instead, we will state several consequences of 
modularity and provide examples that attempt to convey an 
intuitive understanding of the proofs. Those interested in 
the proofs should see [9]. 
Conditional independence 
The first consequence we discuss concerns a common 
situation where several pieces of evidence bear on a single 
hypothesis. This is shown below: 
E1 
E� 2 H 
En 
/ 
Let {H denote the set {El' E2, • . En).l Consider a single 
item of evidence E1 in eH and let e be any subset of eH 
which does not include E1• In this situation, it can be 
proved that the modularity property ( 1 )  holds if and only if 
and (3) 
Equation (3) says that the belief in E1 does not depend on 
the knowledge that e is true when H is definitely true or 
definitely false. When (3) holds, it is said that evidence is 
condirionaffy independenT given U and its negation. 
Let us consider this correspondence between conditional 
independence and the modularity property in the context of 
the urn problem above. In the example, it is a simple matter 
to see why the modularity property is violated; draws are 
done without replacement, making evidence conditionally 
dependent. For example, 
p(2nd draw blackjH2A1st draw black) = 0 
and 
p(2nd draw black!H2Alst draw white) = 1/2. 
Clearly, condition (3) is not satisfied in the example; this is 
consistent with our previous observation that modularity does 
not hold. 
The urn problem can be modified such that the modularity 
property is satisfied. If draws are done with replacement, the 
conditional independence condition (3) is satisfied. In 
particular, for any e: 
p(W I H 1Ae) = p(WjH1) = 1/3 
p(Wj-H1Ae) = p(WjH2Ae) = p(WIH2) 213 
where W denotes the draw of a white ball and e denotes 
draws made prior to W. Since (3) is satisfied, the modularity 
property holds and we can compute CF(HpW), a function of 
only two arguments, using relation (2): 
h(H1,W) = (1/3)/(213) = .5 
CF(HpW) = .5 - 1 = -.5. 
Other certainty factors relevant to the problem can be 
calculated in a similar fashion. 
Unfortunately, semantic modularity' only holds in extremely 
simple situations like the one above. Any small increase in 
the complexity of the problem will result in the loss of 
modularity. For example, suppose an individual is given one 
of three urns: 
Making draws with replacement, evidence is conditionally 
independent given each of the hypotheses H1• H2, and H3• 
However, evidence is no longer conditionally independent 
given the negation of any hypothesis. For example. if each 
hypothesis is equally likely before any draws, the initial 
probability of drawing a black ball given -H1 is 
p(BI-Ht) 
p(BA-H1) I p(-HI) 
[p(BAH2) + p(BAH3)] I p(-H1) 
[p(BjH2)p(H2) + p(BjH3)p(H3)] I p(-H1) 
[(0)(113) + (1)(113}] I (213} 
1/2 
However, if a white ball is drawn, H3 is ruled out and the 
probability of drawing a black ball changes to 
p(Bj-H1AW) = p(BIH2) = 0. 
Given the correspondence between the conditional 
independence assumption (3) and the modularity property (1) 
cited above, it follows that the rules describing this situation 
cannot be semantically modular. Indeed, using (2) we find 
that 
X(H1,B,W} = oo ==> CF(HpB,W) = 1 
and therefore 
Intuitively, if a black ball is drawn first, one's belief in H1 
does not change significantly. However, if a black ball is 
drawn following the draw of a white ball, H3 is ruled out 
and H 1 is confirmed. Thus, the certainty factor for H 1 
depends on other pieces of evidence (other rules in the 
inference network). Consequently, the rules representing this 
knowledge are not modular. 
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The lack of modularity can be traced directly to the fact 
that there are more than two mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive events. In such cases, -Hi is a "mixture" of 
hypotheses and thus evidence will not be conditionally 
independent given -Hi even when evidence is conditionally 
independent given each Hi. Since the conditional 
independence assumption (3) is not satisfied, the modularity 
property cannot hold. This result can be rigorously derived. 
It can be shown that whenever a set of mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive hypotheses contains more than two elements, 
the conditional independence assumption (3) is incompatible 
with multiple updating [10]. 
We must emphasize the severe nature of this implication of 
the conditional independence assumption. Clearly, it is. 
seldom true in real-world applications. Furthermore, given 
the correspondence between (3) and (1), it follows that the 
assumption of semantic modularity is at least as restrictive. 
A restriction on the topology or inrerence networks 
Another restrictive consequence of semantic modularity is 
that evidence cannot, in most circumstances, be propagated in 
a consistent manner through networks in which a single piece 
of evidence bears on more than one hypothesis4 as shown 
below: 
Notice the asymmetry between the case of convergent links 
discussed above and this case of divergent links. In the 
former case, the propagation of uncertainty is possible 
provided conditional independence is assumed. In the latter 
case. propagation in a manner consistent with the modularity 
property is essentially impossible. 
To illustrate the difficulty associated with divergent links, 
consider the following story due to Kim and Pearl [ 1 1]: 
Mr. Holmes received a telephone call from his 
neighbor notifying him that she heard a burglar 
alarm sound from the direction of his home. As 
he was preparing to rush home, Mr. Holmes 
recalled that last time the alarm had been triggered 
by an earthq,mke. On his way driving home, he 
heard a radio newscast reporting an earthquake 200 
miles away. 
An inference network corresponding to this story is shown in 
Figure 2. 
. 
? Burglary 
Phone / 
call --�Alarm 
� Earthquake 
Radio / . 
announcement 
Figure 2: An inference network for Mr. Holmes' situation 
A problem arises in trying to assign certainty factors to the 
rules which have "Alarm" as the antecedent. Since Mr. 
Holmt>s heard the radio announcement, the alarm sound tends 
to support the earthquake hypothesis. However, had Mr. 
llolmes not heard the radio announcement, the alarm sound 
would lend more support to the burglary hypothesis. Thus, 
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the rules above are not modular since their impact depends 
on the belief about another proposition in the network. 
There is an intuitive explanation for this lack of 
modularity. A priori, the earthquake hypothesis and burglary 
hypothesis are independent. However, knowledge of the 
alarm status induces a dependency between these hypotheses. 
In particular, once Mr. Holmes knows the alarm has sounded, 
evidence for one hypothesis is ind.irect evidence against the 
other. This dependency couples the rules in such a way that 
modularity is lost. 
In this scenario, the loss of modularity is consistent with 
the general result cited above. Because the network contains 
divergent links ("IF Alarm THEN Burglary" and "IF Alarm 
THEN Earthquake"), updating is only possible if the 
semantic modularity property, (1), does not hold. 
The myth of modularity 
As noted above, extremely few expert system domains 
satisfy the severely restrictive consequences of semantic 
modularity described in the previous section. Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine a domain in which all sets of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses contain only two 
elements and in which divergent links do not occur. It 
follows, therefore, that semantic modularity rarely exists in 
rule-based systems which use the CF model to manage 
uncertainty. Earlier, however, we argued that rules in 
deductive systems (CF's = ±1) are semantically modular. 
The distinction between categorical and non-categorical 
rules is suggested by ti fundamental difference between 
deductive and plausible reasoning alluded to earlier. Suppose 
a hypothesis is believed with certainty. In this case, no 
additional information can refute its truth. In particular, if 
a knowledge base contains the rule 
"IF E THEN H" (CF = 1), and if E is categorically 
established, then H is also established beyond any doubt. 
The addition of other rules to the knowledge base or the 
establishment of other rule antecedents cannot affect this 
conclusion. However, if a hypothesis is uncertain, the degree 
to which it is believed is sensitive to new information. If a 
knowledge base contains the rule 
"IF E THEN H" (CF "" +1), then additional information 
such as new evidence for H can affect the certainty factor 
for this rule. 
In general, the strength of association between antecedent 
and consequent in a non-categorical rule will change when 
other rules are added to or deleted from a knowledge base. 
This suggests that semantic modularity (in a more general 
sense) will rarely hold in any rule-based system which must 
manage uncertainty. Thus, it appears that non-categorical 
rules will maintain syntactic modularity but not semantic 
modularity. The notion that syntactic and semantic 
modularity go hand in hand is a myth . 
A weaker notion of modularity-
Since the assumption of semantic modularity places severe 
constraints on the relationships among propositions in a 
knowledge base, it seems useful to modify the ruled-based 
representation scheme to accommodate a weaker form of 
semantic modularity that is appropriate for plausible 
reasoning. In this section, we examine a methodo.logy for 
representing and propagating uncertainty called influence 
diagrams [12] and show that this approach suggests a weaker 
form of modularity suited to plausible reasoning.5 
We first informally describe the influence diagram 
methodology. In doing so, we show how this approach is 
used to represent the example prohlems discussed above. We 
next contrast the influence diagram methodology with the 
inference network approach. Finally. we develop the weaker 
notion of semantic modularity suggested by the approach. 
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An influence diagram is a two-level structure. The upper 
level of an influence diagram consists of a graph that 
represents the propositions relevant to a problem as well as 
relationships among ·them. Nodes (circles) are used to 
rerresent prorositions and directed arcs are used to represent 
dependencies among the propositions. The bottom level 
represents all possible values or outcomes for each 
rrorosition together with a probability distribution for each 
rrorosition. The nrcs in the upper level represent the notion 
of probabilistic conditioning or influence. In particular, an 
arc from proposition A to proposition B means that the 
probability distribution for B can be influenced by the values 
of A. If there is no arc from A to B, the probability 
distribution for ll is independent of the values of A. Thus, 
the influence diagram representation is useful for 
representing assumptions of conditional independence. 
Notice that an arc from A to B may be interpreted as either 
a causal influence or an associational influence; no 
distinction is made between these two concepts in an 
influence diagram. 
To illustrate these concepts, consider once again the three 
urn problem. An influence diagram for this problem is 
shown in Figure 3. 
Level1: 
Level2: 
Node: Color of ball drawn Node: Identity of urn 
Identity 
p(Color l td entity) of urn Values Values p(ldentity) 
H White 1/2 H 113 1 Black 112 1 
H2 Wtlite 1 H2 113 Black 0 
H3 White 0 H3 113 Black 1 
Figure 3: An influence diagram for the three urn problem 
The two nodes labeled "Identity of urn" and "Color of ball 
drawn" in the uprer level of the diagram represent the 
propositions relevant to the problem. The tables in the lower 
level list the possible values for each proposition. The arc 
between the two nodes in the upper level means that the 
prohability distribution for "Color of ball drawn" ·depends on 
the value of "Identity of urn." Consequently, the probability 
distribution for "Color of ball drawn" given in the second 
level of the diagram is conditioned on each of the three 
rossible values of "Identity of urn": H1• H2• and H3. Note 
that since there are no arcs into the "Identity of urn" node 
an unconditional or marginal distribution for this 
proposition is given. Also note that the same urn problem 
can be represented by an influence diagram with the arc 
reversed. In this case, a marginal probability distribution 
would be assigned to "Color of ball drawn" and ·a conditional 
probability distribution would be assigned to "Identity of 
urn." 
We see that there are several significant differences 
between influence diagrams and inference networks. The 
first difference is that an influence diagram is a two-level 
structure while the inference network contains only one level. 
Another difference is that propositions in an influence 
diagram can take on any number (possibly infinite) of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive values. In an inference 
network, propositions typically can only take on the values 
"true" and "false." Another distinction is that influence 
diagrams represent uncertain relationships among 
propositions using the concept of probabilistic dependency 
while inference networks represent uncertain relationships 
using the concept of belief update. 
The story of Mr. Holmes illustrates another difference 
between influence diagrams and inference networks. The top 
level of an influence diagram for Mr. Holmes' situation is 
shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: An influence diagram for Mr. Holmes' situation 
Notice that many of the nodes in the graph are not directly 
co_nnected by arcs. As mentioned earlier, the missing arcs are 
interpreted as statements of conditional independence. For 
example, the lack of a direct arc between "Burglary" and 
"Phone· call" indicates "Burglary" influences "Phone call" only 
through its influence on "Alarm." In other words, "Burglary" 
and "Phone call" are conditionally independent given 
"Alarm." This would not be true if, for example, Mr. 
Holmes believed his neighbor might be the thief. We see 
from this example that influence diagrams provide a flexible 
means by which experts can assert assumptions of conditional 
independence that ·coincide with their beliefs. That is, 
assumptions of conditional independence are impoud by the 
expert. In contrast, assumptions of independence are 
imposed by the methodology in semantically modular 
inference networks. 
Due to differences between inference networks and 
influence diagrams, problems that cannot be represented in 
the former approach can be represented in the latter. For 
example, the three urn problem could not be represented 
using an inference network because there were three mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses. However, representing 
more than two mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses 
is quite straightforward in influence diagrams. The problem 
of Mr. Holmes could not be represented using an inference 
network because of strong dependencies among "Alarm," 
"Burglary," and "Earthquake." In an influence diagram, 
however, these dependencies are naturally represented by the 
two arcs entering the "Alarm" node. In particular, since 
there are arcs from both the burglary and earthquake 
propositions to the alarm proposition, the second level of the 
influence diagram will contain the probability distribution 
for "Alarm" as a function all the possible values of both of 
these propositions. That is, the following probabilities will 
be included in the lower level of the influence diagram: 
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p{AlarmjBurglaryAEarthquake) 
p{-AlarmjBurglaryAEarthquake) 
p{AlarmjBurglaryA-Earthquake) 
p{-AlarmjBurglaryA-Earthquake) 
p(Alarmj-BurglaryAEarthquake) 
p{-Alarmj-BurglaryAEarthquake) 
p(Alarmj-BurglaryA-Earthquake) 
p(-Alarmj-BurglaryA-Earthquake) 
The interaction between the burglary and earthquake 
hypotheses is completely captured by this probability 
distribution.6 In general, it can he shown if an inference 
problem can be solved in a decision-theoretic framework 
then it can be represented with an influence diagram [13]. 
As we have seen, this cannot be said for inference networks. 
Now we are ready to consider a weaker notion of semantic 
modularity associated with the influence diagram 
representation. Imagine that a proposition is added to an 
influence diagram. When this occurs, the expert must first 
reassess the dependency structure of the diagram. For 
example, the new node may be influenced by other nodes, 
may itself influence other nodes, or may introduce 
conditional independencies or conditional dependencies 
among nodes currently in the network. Then, the expert 
must reassess the probability distribution for each node 
which had its incoming arcs modified. However, given the 
definition of an arc in an influence diagram, there is no 
need to modify the probability distributions for the nodes in 
the network whose incoming arcs were not modified. 
Similarly, if a proposition is deleted from an influence 
diagram, the expert must first reassess dependencies in the 
network and then modify only the probability distributions 
for those nodes which had their incoming arcs modified. 
The ability to add and delete propositions from an influence 
diagram without the need to reassign distributions for all 
nodes in the diagram is the weaker form of semantic 
modularity we have sought. 
To illustrate the concept of weak semantic modularity, 
consider the following modification to Mr. Holmes' 
dilemma: 
Shortly after hearing the radio announcement, 
Mr. Holmes realizes that it is April first. He then 
recalls the April fools prank he perpetrated on his 
neighbor the previous year and reconsiders the 
nature of the phone call. 
Given this new information, an "April fools" node should be 
added to the influence diagram as well as a conditioning arc 
from the new node to "Phone call." Furthermore, it appears 
that "April fools" directly influences only "Phone call" and 
that no other arcs need be added. Therefore, given the 
weaker form of semantic modularity we have outlined, only 
the probability distribution for "Phone call" need be 
reassessed; all other distributions remain intact. Note that 
the syntax of influence diagrams exactly parallels the new 
notion of semantic modulnrity we have defined. Thus, the 
influence diagram methodology is a framework in which the 
notions of semantic and syntactic modularity can be united 
in the context of plausible reasoning. 
Summary 
In this paper, we have scrutinized the concept of 
modularity in detail. We have argued that this notion 
consists of two distinct concepts which we have called 
syntactic modularity and semantic modularity. We have 
argued that when reasoning under certainty, it is reasonable 
to regard the rule-based approach as semantically modular 
but when reasoning under uncertainty, semantic modularity 
rarely holds. To illustrate this point, we have examined the 
concept of semantic modularity in the context of the MYCIN 
certainty factor model and demonstrated that the assumption 
of semantic modularity entails both a strong conditional 
independence assumption and a strong restriction on the 
topology of the network. We have argued that such 
restrictions can rarely be met in practical applications and 
that consequently, semantic modularity does not hold in such 
situations. In addition, we have examined the implications 
of the semantic modularity assumption on knowledge 
engineering. Finally, we have described influence diagrams as 
a representation approach which accommodates a weaker 
form of semantic modularity appropriate for plausible 
reasoning. 
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Notes 
11n another paper in this proceedings [3], the concept of a 
measure of change in belief or belief update is discussed in 
general terms. 
2Technically, this assertion only holds for evidence e such 
that E does not lie on a directed path from e to H in the 
inference network. The certainty factor model explicitly 
handles the case where E lies on a directed path from e to H 
(see [9]). 
3For simplicity, we will assume that prior information is 
included in cH and that pieces of evidence are logically 
distinct. 
4Consistent propagation is possible if no other rules bear 
on H1 or H2. 
5We note that the Bayesian networks of Pearl (2] and the 
causal networks of Cooper [1] are closely related to 
influence diagrams. In fact, all three approaches suggest the 
same form of semantic modularity. 
�his example reveals a potential disadvantage of the 
influence diagram approach. In general, the number of 
probability assessments required for a single node is 
exponential in the number links converging on the node. 
However, Kim and Pearl [ 1 1] have developed a method 
whereby the probability distribution for a node can be 
calculated from "lower-order" probabilities in many 
situations. For example, their method can be used to 
calculate p( -AiarmiBurglaryAEarthquake) from 
p(-AiarmiBurglary) and p( -AiarmiEarthquake). 
References 
I. Cooper, G. F. NESTOR: A Computer-based Medical 
Diagnostic Aid that Integrates Causal and Probabilistic 
Knowledge. Ph.D. Th., Computer Science Department, 
Stanford University, Nov. 1984. Rep. No. STAN-CS-84-48. 
Also numbered HPP-84-48. 
2. Pearl, J. Fusion, propagation, and structuring in Bayesian 
networks. Presented at the Symposium on Complexity of 
Approximately Solved Problems, Columbia University, 1985 
3. Beckerman, D.E. An Axiomatic Framework for Belief 
Updates. Proceedings of AAAI Workshop on Uncertainty 
and Probability in Artificial Intelligence, AAAI, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, August, 1986. 
4. Davis, R. and King, J.J. The Origin of Rule-Based 
Systems· in AI. In Rule-Based Expert Systems, Buchanan, 
B.G. and Shortliffe, E.H., Eds., Addison-Wesley, Menlo Park, 
1984, ch. 2. 
5. Shortliffe, E. H. and Buchanan, B. G. A model of 
inexact reasoning in medicine. Mathematical Biosciences 23 
(1975), 351-379. 
6. Buchanan, B. G., and Shortliffe, E. H., eds.. Rule-Based 
Expert Systems: The MYClN Experiments of the Stanford 
Heuristic Programming Project. Addison-Wesley, Reading, 
Mass., 1984. 
120 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
a 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
7. Horvitz, E. J., and Heckerman, D. E. The Inconsistent 
Use of Measures of Certainty in Artificial Intelligence 
Research. In Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, North 
Holland, New York, 1986. 
8. Duda, R., Hart, P., and Nilsson, N. Subjective Bayesian 
Methods for Rule-based Inference Systems. Proceedings 1976 
National Computer Conference, AFIPS, 1976, pp. 1075-1082.' 
9. Heckerman, D.E. Probabilistic Interpretations for 
MYCIN's Certainty Factors. In Uncertainty in Artificial 
Intelligence, North Holland, New York, 1986. 
10. Johnson, R. Independence and Bayesian updating 
methods. In Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, North 
Holland, 1986. 
121 
II. Kim, J.H., and Pearl, J. A Computational Model for 
Causal and Diagnostic Reasoning in Inference Engines. 
Proceedings 8th International Joint Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, IJCAI, 1983, pp. 190-193. 
12. Howard, R. A., Matheson, J. E. Influence Diagrams. In 
Readings on the Principles and Applications of Decision 
Analysis, Howard, R. A., Matheson, J. E., Eds., Strategic 
Decisions Group, Menlo Park, CA, 1981, ch. 37, , pp. 
721-762. 
13. Shachter, R.D. Evaluating Influence Diagrams. To be 
published in Operations Research (19�6). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
